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Abstract
The vulnerabilities of a PCA-based face verification sys-
tem against a hill-climbing attack using the uphill-simplex
algorithm are studied. Experiments are carried out on the
face subcorpus of the publicly available BioSecure DB,
where the attack has shown a remarkable performance
proving the lack of robustness of the tested system to this
type of threat. Furthermore, the proposed attacking scheme
is not only able to bypass the security of the recognition
system, but it is also capable of reconstructing the users
face image, with the privacy concerns that this entails. As
a possible countermeasure to minimize the effect of the at-
tack, score quantization is applied. This protection method
is able to reduce both the success rate and the efficiency of
the attack, however it does not completely succeed in pre-
venting a possible intruder from accessing the system. The
study also highlights the high adaptation capabilities of the
proposed attack which had already been used to break a
signature-based verification system.
1. Introduction
Due to the fact that biometrics [10], as an automatic
means of human recognition, constitutes a relatively novel
field of research, most efforts undertaken by the different
parties involved in the development of this technology (re-
searchers, industry, evaluators, etc.) have been mainly (but
not exclusively) directed to the improvement of its perfor-
mance [11]. This has left partially uncovered other impor-
tant aspects involved in the complex biometric recognition
problem.
In particular, it has not been until recently when biomet-
ric security assessment has emerged in the biometric com-
munity as a primary field of research, as a consequence of
the concern arisen after the classification of the vulnerabil-
ity points presented in [16] (shown in Fig. 1), and the dif-
ferent efficient attacking algorithms developed in order to
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Figure 1. Architecture of an automated biometric verification sys-
tem. Possible attack points given in [16] are numbered from 1 to
8.
compromise the security level given by biometric applica-
tions [6, 19].
These vulnerability studies have helped to improve the
biometric technology by making public certain flaws and
by encouraging the industry and researchers to look for so-
lutions to the different threats [9, 22, 18]. This way, the level
of security and the convenience offered to the final user are
increased.
Most of the existing works studying the vulnerabilities
of biometric systems to attacks against the inner modules of
the system (those labeled from 2 to 8 in Fig. 1), use some
type of variant of the hill-climbing algorithm presented in
[17]. Some examples include an attack to a face-based sys-
tem in [2], and to standard and Match-on-Card minutiae-
based fingerprint verification systems in [21] and [12] re-
spectively. These types of attacks take advantage of the
score given by the matcher to iteratively change a synthet-
ically generated template until the similarity score exceeds
a fixed decision threshold and thereby access to the system
is granted. Except for the algorithm proposed in [7], all of
these hill-climbing approaches are highly dependent on the
technology used, only being usable for very specific types
of matchers.
However, recently, a general hill-climbing algorithm
based on the uphill-simplex algorithm was presented and
tested using a signature verification system [8]. In the
present contribution this general method is successfully ap-
plied to attack an automatic face recognition system based
on eigenfaces, proving this way its biometric independency
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Figure 2. Diagram of the modification scheme for the uphill-simplex algorithm.
and its ability to adapt to different matchers that use fixed
length feature vectors of real numbers.
The experiments are conducted on the BioSecure
database [14], and clearly show the high attacking potential
of the algorithm, pointing out the need to develop adequate
countermeasures against it. Furthermore, the hill-climbing
approach is shown to be faster than the previous general
method proposed in [7] for all the operating points evalu-
ated.
Score quantization is then analysed as a possible method
to minimize the effect of the attack. Although it reduces
both the success rate and the efficiency of the hill-climbing
algorithm, it does not succeed in preventing a possible in-
truder from accessing the system.
The paper is structured as follows. The hill-climbing at-
tack algorithm used in the experiments is outlined in Sect. 2,
while the attacked system is presented in Sect. 3. The
database and experimental protocol followed are described
in Sect 4. The results of the attack and of the quantization
scheme studied as countermeasure are detailed in Sect. 5.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 6.
2. Hill Climbing Attack Based on the uphill-
simplex Algorithm
In a generic hill-climbing attack, synthetic templates are
generated and iteratively modified according to the similar-
ity score given by a matcher, until the verification threshold
 is reached (as can be seen in Fig. 2 top).
In the present contribution we use the attack based on the
uphill-simplex algorithm, first presented in [8]. The core
idea behind the algorithm is to iteratively change a sim-
plex (a polygon with k + 1 vertices in the k-dimensional
space) so that it approaches the objective (the user account
being attacked, defined as C). In each iteration, the simi-
larity score (si) from each simplex vertex (yi) to the tar-
get (C) is computed, according to a matching function (J ),
si = J (C;yi), with i = 1; : : : ; k + 1. The vertex fur-
thest to the objective, yl, is discarded and substituted by a
new point, which, as can be seen in Fig. 2 (bottom), can be
computed in three different ways, namely: i) reflection, ac-
cording to a previously fixed  parameter; if reflection fails,
either ii) expansion (with the  parameter) or iii) contrac-
tion (with the  parameter) are used as a means to compute
the new vertex. This process continues until the maximum
score of the vertices exceeds the verification threshold or
the maximum number of iterations allowed is reached.
3. Face Verification System Attacked
The described hill-climbing attack based on the uphill-
simplex algorithm is used to evaluate the security of an
Eigenface-based face verification system [20]. This tech-
nique uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to derive
Figure 3. Typical face images that can be found in the BioSecure DB.
a vector which represents the face images in a lower dimen-
sional space, and it was used to present initial face verifi-
cation results for the recent Face Recognition Grand Chal-
lenge [15].
The evaluated system uses cropped face images of size
64 80 to train a PCA vector space where 80% of the vari-
ance is retained. This leads to a system where the original
image space of 5120 dimensions is reduced to 100 dimen-
sions (or eigenvectors). Similarity scores are computed in
this PCA vector space using the Euclidean distance, as it
showed a very competitive performance compared to the
rest of the similarity measures tested.
4. Experimental Protocol
The experiments are carried out on the face subcorpus in-
cluded in the Desktop Dataset of the BioSecure multimodal
database [14]. BioSecure DB, which is publicly available
through the BioSecure Foundation1, was acquired thanks to
the joint effort of 11 European institutions and has become
one of the standard benchmarks for biometric performance
and security evaluation [13].
The database comprises three datasets captured under
different acquisition scenarios, namely: i) the Internet
Dataset (DS1, captured through the Internet in an unsuper-
vised setup), ii) the Desktop Dataset (DS2, captured in an
office-like environment with human supervision), and iii)
the Mobile Dataset (DS3, acquired on mobile devices and
with uncontrolled conditions). The Desktop Dataset com-
prises voice, fingerprints, face, iris, signature and hand of
210 users, captured in two time-spaced acquisition sessions.
The face subset used in this work includes four frontal im-
ages (two per session) with an homogeneous grey back-
ground, and captured with a reflex digital camera without
flash. Typical examples of face images that can be found in
BioSecure DS2 are shown in Fig. 3.
4.1. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the evaluated system is computed
using the experimental protocol shown in Fig. 4. The
1http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB/
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Figure 4. Diagram showing the partitioning of the BioSecure DB
according to the performance evaluation protocol defined in the
present work.
database is divided into: i) a training set comprising the
first three samples of 170 clients (used to compute both the
PCA transformation matrix and the enrolment templates),
and ii) an evaluation set formed by the fourth image of the
previous 170 users (used to compute the genuine scores),
and all the 4 images of the remaining 40 users with which
the impostor scores are calculated. As a result of using the
same subjects for PCA training and client enrolment, the
system performance is optimistically biased, and therefore
harder to attack than in a practical situation (in which the
enrolled clients may not have been used for PCA training).
This means that the results presented in this paper are a con-
servative estimate of the attack’s success rate.
The final score given by the system is the average of the
scores obtained after matching the input vector to the three
templates of the attacked client model C. In Fig. 5 we can
see the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection
Rate (FRR) curves of the Eigenface-based system using the
described protocol. The system has an Equal Error Rate of
4.85%. The three operating points where the hill-climbing
algorithm is evaluated (corresponding to FAR = 0.1%, FAR
= 0.05%, and FAR = 0.01%) are also highlighted. These
operating points correspond to a low, medium, and high se-
curity application according to [1].
4.2. Experimental Protocol for the Attacks
In order to generate the user accounts to be attacked with
the hill-climbing algorithm, we used the train set defined in
the performance evaluation protocol (i.e., three first sam-
ples of 170 users as shown in Fig. 4). The performance of
the attack will be evaluated in terms of the success rate and
efficiency, defined as [5]:
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Figure 5. FAR and FRR curves for the system.
 Success Rate (SR): it is the expected probability that
the attack breaks a given account. It is computed as
the ratio between the number of broken accounts (AB)
and the total number of accounts attacked (AT = 170):
SR = AB=AT . This parameter indicates how dan-
gerous the attack is: the higher the SR, the bigger the
threat.
 Efficiency (Eff): it indicates the average number of
matchings needed by the attack to break an account. It
is defined as E = 1=
PAB
i=1 ni=AB

, where ni is
the number of matchings computed to bypass each of
the broken accounts. This parameter gives an estima-
tion of how easy it is for the attack to break into the
system in terms of speed: the higher the Eff, the faster
the attack.
A direct comparison between the attack performance re-
sults obtained in this work and those presented in the only
previous work evaluating a general hill-climbing algorithm
[7] will also be given in Sect. 5.
5. Results
In the first set of experiments, the performance of the at-
tack at different operating points is studied and compared to
the results obtained by other state of the art attacking algo-
rithms. Then, we analyse score quantization as a possible
protection method and we study its impact on the SR and
Eff of the attacking scheme.
The goal of the security evaluation experiments is
twofold, i) on the one hand, to study the vulnerability of
an automatic face recognition system to the proposed hill-
climbing algorithm, and ii) on the other hand, to test the
efficiency of the attack against recognition systems work-
ing on different biometric traits (it was already successfully
used to attack an on-line signature verification system in
[8]).
FAR Uphill-simplex HC Bayesian HC [7]SR Eff (10 4) SR Eff (10 4)
0.10% 100% 22.124 99.0% 11.905
0.05% 100% 22.472 98.5% 9.363
0.01% 100% 21.930 86.0% 2.226
Table 1. Eff and SR at the operating points tested, compared to
those obtained by the Bayesian hill-climbing attack in [7].
FAR Face Verif. System Signature Verif. Syst. [8]SR Eff (10 4) SR Eff (10 4)
0.05% 100% 22.472 91.32% 8.489
0.01% 100% 21.930 88.43% 7.391
Table 2. Eff and SR at the operating points tested, compared to
those obtained with the on-line signature verification system tested
in [8].
5.1. Analysis of different operating points
The performance of the attack is tested at three differ-
ent operating points, namely: i) FAR = 0.10%, ii) FAR =
0.05%, iii) FAR = 0.01%. These are the same operating
points at which a very similar face verification system was
evaluated in [7]. Therefore, the results obtained in both
works may be compared in a fair fashion. The results of
the experiments are detailed in Table 1.
As can be observed, the algorithm presented here suc-
cessfully breaks all the attacked accounts, contrary to the
Bayesian hill-climbing algorithm described in [7], existing
a significant SR difference between the two approaches at
the last operating point (i.e., 100% vs 86%). Moreover,
while the efficiency decreases substantially along the three
operating points for the previous algorithm, for the attack
proposed in the present work it remains almost invariant, re-
gardless of the operating point considered. This leads to an
efficiency which is ten times faster at the last operating point
between the two attacks (i.e., 21.93010 4 scores needed
to break an account against almost 2.22210 4).
In Table 2 we show the Eff as well as the SR of the at-
tack for the two common operating points (in terms of FAR)
attacked in the present work and in [8], where this same al-
gorithm was used to attack an on-line signature verification
system. It has to be emphasized that the parameters of the
algorithm used in the present work are the same ones which
were optimized in [8]:  = 1:1;  = 0:8;  = 1:1. The fact
that the SR and the Eff improve for the present case study
proves the robustness of the algorithm: it is able to break to-
tally heterogeneous systems working on different biometric
traits and matchers, even improving its performance, with-
out specifically adjusting its parameters.
It should also be noticed that in the present work the hill-
climbing attack is initialized from a normal distribution of
zero mean and unit variance, that is, the algorithm is able to
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Figure 6. Example of the evolution of the score and the synthetic eigenfaces through the iterations of the attack for a broken account. The
dashed line represents the objective threshold.
QS 10 6 10 2 10 1 1 2:5 5
PI (%) 9.83 7.62 2.22 0.25 0.01 0.01
EER (%) 4.85 4.85 4.87 4.90 5.85 9.12
Table 3. Percentage of the iterations of the hill-climbing attack
with a positive score increase (PI), and EER of the system for dif-
ferent quantization steps (QS) of the matching score.
QS 10 6 10 1 2:5
SR 97.65% 78.24% 61.76%
Eff (10 4) 20.284 20.202 13.158
Table 4. Performance (in terms of SR and Eff) of the hill-climbing
attack against the system for different quantization steps (QS).
break the system without needing any real training faces to
generate the first simplex.
In Fig. 6 an example of the execution of the attack is
shown. The evolution of the score through the iterations of
the algorithm is depicted together with six points (including
the first and the last one) of the iterative process (marked
with letters A to F). The dashed line represents the objec-
tive value to be reached (i.e, the threshold ). The two up-
per faces correspond to one of the original images of the
attacked user and its representation in the PCA space. The
sequence of the six faces below correspond to the feature
vector that produced each of the six scores marked with A to
F, starting from a random face (A) and finishing with an im-
age (F) capable of breaking the system (i.e., similar enough
to the target user labelled as “Original-PCA”).
5.2. Countermeasuring the Attack: Score Quanti-
zation
The results achieved by the hill-climbing attack based
on the uphill-simplex algorithm against the face recognition
system considered in the experiments have shown its high
vulnerability against this type of attacking approach and the
need to incorporate some attack protection method that in-
creases its robustness against this threat. In this section we
analyse the performance of score quantization as a way to
countermeasure the attack.
Score quantization has been proposed as an effective
biometric-based approach to reduce the effects of hill-
climbing attacks by quantizing the score so that the hill-
climbing algorithm does not get the necessary positive feed-
back to iteratively increase the similarity measure. Al-
though Adler presented a modified attacking algorithm for
PCA-based face recognition systems robust to this counter-
measure [3], the BioAPI consortium [4] recommends that
biometric algorithms emit only quantized matching scores
in order to prevent eventual hill-climbing attacks. Here, we
will study the efficiency of this attack protection technique
against the proposed hill-climbing algorithm.
We will consider the Eigenface-based system operating
at medium security operating point (FAR = 0.05%). For
the hill-climbing attack we will assume the same config-
uration used in the vulnerability assessment experiments,
[; ; ] = [1:1; 0:8; 1:1] (which, as mentioned before, is
taken from [8]).
In order to choose the quantization step we analyse the
results obtained from the attack performed in Sect. 5 un-
der the previously described conditions, and the findings are
summarized in Table 3. QS stands for Quantization Step, PI
is the percentage of iterations out of the total performed in
the attack that produced a Positive Increase in the matching
score (i.e., the score increase was higher than the quantiza-
tion step), and EER is the Equal Error Rate of the system
for the quantization step considered.
From the results shown in Table 3 we can see that for the
last QS considered (5) the EER suffers a big increase (QS
is too big), while for the previous QS values the system per-
formance is not significantly affected. Therefore, the hill-
climbing attack is repeated considering the three QS values
QS = 10 6, QS = 10 1, and QS = 2:5 . Results are pre-
sented in Table 4, where we can see that score quantization
reduces the success chances of the attack (for bigger QS,
the SR decreases). However, it can also be noticed that the
attacking algorithm is quite robust to this type of counter-
measure, as even for the biggest value of QS (increasing it
would imply a deterioration of the system EER as shown in
Table 3), the SR of the attack is still over 60%.
6. Conclusions
The robustness of an Eigenface-based face verification
system against a hill-climbing attack based on the uphill-
simplex algorithm has been studied. Given the 100% suc-
cess rate reached in all the experiments and the very few
comparisons needed for breaking the accounts, its vulnera-
bilities against this kind of attacks have been clearly shown.
Furthermore, the experimental results reached in the
present work added to those presented in [8], have proven
that the hill-climbing attack based on the uphill-simplex
algorithm can be successfully applied to break automatic
recognition systems working on different biometric traits
without even specifically adjusting its parameters.
As a possible way to minimize the effect of the attack,
score quantization, with several quantization steps, was
studied. Although it considerably reduced the SR of the at-
tack and increased the number of comparisons needed, the
proposed attacking scheme proved its robustness to this type
of countermeasure.
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